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INTRODUCTION

So great is the ascendency of the law of actions in the infancy of courts
of justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see
the law through the envelope of its technical forms.
-Sir

Henry Maine'

* The author thanks Professor Harold G. Maier, Vanderbilt University, without

whom this Note would have been impossible.
1. R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
TIVE 3 (1952) (quoting H. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1907)).

PERSPEC-
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Although the usually proclaimed goals of the United States legal system are "fair play and justice," a person who is injured in some way,
who feels that he has had his rights violated, or who seeks to enforce a
business agreement, may not necessarily have a remedy in its judicial
system. Often a court may claim it lacks power to hear a case because it
does not have jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter of the
suit. Another motive of a court for refusing to hear the case may be
simply the necessity to clear its docket. One proposed remedy to such
situations is the development of a jurisdiction by necessity doctrine. The
doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity would permit assertions of jurisdiction which might be untenable under current jurisdictional standards,
but in which a plaintiff has no alternative way to seek a remedy. Adoption of a necessity jurisdiction would promote fair play and justice by
giving an aggrieved plaintiff a forum in which to be heard. However, it
is difficult to craft the doctrine so that it helps deserving plaintiffs without imposing unfair burdens upon defendants and the court system as a
whole.
A typical situation calling for necessity jurisdiction is when a United
States plaintiff brings suit against a foreign defendant who has had only
limited and scattered contact with the United States. Often the plaintiff
is forced to go to the defendant's country even though the cause of action
arose in the United States and that foreign forum could be hostile to the
United States plaintiff. This Note examines the historical background of
jurisdiction from the nineteenth century through the guiding principles
of today. A potential basis is then set out for developing a necessity jurisdiction. In addition, this Note examines the positive and negative aspects
of such a doctrine.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JURISDICTION UNTIL
Heitner2

Shaffer v.

In the early years of the twentieth century, United States courts asserted jurisdiction in accordance with standards enunciated in Pennoyer
v. Neff.' In Pennoyer the United States Supreme Court held that "every

2. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Mitchell sued Neff, who was served by publication in a local
paper, in Oregon state court to recover an unpaid fee. Mitchell won a default judgment
and satisfied the judgment by sale to Pennoyer of property Neff owned in Oregon. Neff
then sued Pennoyer to recover the property, claiming lack of jurisdiction. Neff eventually
won on a technicality; the property was not attached from the start of the action, as
required by Oregon law. Id. at 719-20. The case has become a familiar nightmare to
first-year students of civil procedure.
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state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory . . . and that no tribunal . . . can extend
process beyond that territory to subject persons or property to its decisions." The Court recognized three categories of judicial jurisdiction: in
personam jurisdiction, which confers personal liability; in rem jurisdiction, which arises when the rights of all persons to a certain property are
in question; and quasi in rem jurisdiction, which arises when the rendering of judgment affects the interests of particular persons in a thing.5
This last form of jurisdiction generally involves either claims to the
property upon which jurisdiction is based or claims that are unrelated to
the property but that still give rise to jurisdiction and lead to binding
personal judgments.' The theory behind Pennoyer was that the presence
of property in a state gives the court power to proceed and exercise jurisdiction over the owner of that property.' Application of this territorial
principle presented few problems for the majority of claims.'
The form of attachment jurisdiction set out in Pennoyer reached its
pinnacle with the Supreme Court's decision in Harrisv. Balk.9 In Harris the central issue was whether an intangible debt had a situs in North
Carolina, where Harris resided, or in Maryland, where he was physically present at the time suit was filed."0 The Court held that an obligation follows the debtor wherever he travels, thus placing the situs of the
intangible in Maryland." Rather than confining quasi in rem jurisdiction to a strict territorial view, the Court implied that a plaintiff could
apply this method of obtaining jurisdiction whenever a defendant owned
property in a state, without any question as to whether the defendant

4. Id. at 722.
5. Id. at 727-29. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 33, 39 (1978).
6. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 39.
7. Id. at 46. This notion had developed in English common law which used a writ of
attachment on the defendant's property to force the defendant to appear or a writ that
also sought to compel the defendant to appear but could also be used to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 40-41. See also R. MILLAR, supra note 1, at 74.
8. The territorial concept is not unique to the United States; English common law
provided the basis for the doctrine. See Nygh, The TerritorialOrigin of English Private
InternationalLaw, 2 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 28, 36-37 (1964-67).
9. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). A Maryland Court obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over
Balk, a defendant not present within the jurisdiction, through Harris, a North Carolina
resident who was indebted to Balk. Harris was traveling through Maryland when served
with a writ of attachment by Epstein, a creditor of Balk's. Id. at 216-17.
10. Id. at 221-22.
11. Id. at 222. By their nature, intangibles are susceptible to a large array of possible
legal siti, complicating any jurisdictional analysis.
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had any other contacts with the forum. 2 This decision considerably expanded a plaintiff's ability to bring suit against a defendant not present
within the jurisdiction.13 The territorial considerations of jurisdiction in
Harris and Pennoyer governed until the 1940s, when power concepts
gave way to more qualitative evaluations of jurisdiction. 4
A major shift in the focus of judicial inquiry occurred with the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."6 International Shoe supplemented the traditional power theory by providing a further basis for in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants.1 " Jurisdiction determinations moved from examinations of
the limits of state sovereignty to inquiries into the nature and quality of
a defendant's activities within the forum." In International Shoe the
state of Washington attempted to collect unpaid taxes for unemployment
compensation from a Delaware corporation with a principal place of
business in Missouri." The corporation hired eleven to thirteen salesmen to work within Washington and filled orders received from them."
The Court held that a state could exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant when that defendant has "such contacts ...

with

the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the [defendant] to defend the particular
suit which is brought there."2 The Court concluded that such a "minimum contacts" standard did not violate due process because it "does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "2 1
The minimum contacts standard required a court to evaluate the relationship among the plaintiff, the defendant, the forum state, and the
events surrounding the litigation.22 The practical result of International

12. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 48.
13. See, e.g., Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (permitting the attachment of
stock in the state of incorporation); Siro v. American Express Co., 99 Conn. 95, 121 A.
280 (1923) (plaintiff's purchase of traveler's checks from defendant created an attachable
debt).
14. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 52-53.
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. Silberman, supra note 5, at 51.
17. Case Comment, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall: ForeignDefendants and Minimum Contacts in the Real World, 37 RUT. L. REv. 609, 612 (1985).
Such an inquiry is required by the limit due process places on the power of a state to
assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id. at 611.
18. 326 U.S. at 311-13.
19. Id. at 313-14.
20. Id. at 317.
21. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
22. Silberman, supra note 5, at 52-53.
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Shoe was that states expanded their jurisdiction through long-arm statutes, with the minimum contacts test serving as the constitutional limit
on assertions of jurisdiction.23 This standard requires a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction meets the due
process requirement of minimum contracts, rather than the mechanistic
application of a rule such as those set out in Pennoyer and Harris,and
provides an outer limit to state action.24
In the aftermath of InternationalShoe, states used the minimum contacts analysis to expand their exercise of jurisdiction. This exercise of
permissible jurisdiction grew to its broadest in McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co.25 In McGee a California resident purchased life insurance
from a Texas corporation, paying premiums to the insurance corporation
by mail from California.26 The Texas corporation maintained no office
or agents within California and conducted no other business there.2 7 The
company refused to pay when the insured made a claim under the policy, and the beneficiary brought suit in a California state court in accordance with a California statute.2 The United States Supreme Court
ruled that California could properly assert jurisdiction based upon a single isolated contact with the forum state, provided that the contact bore a
substantial connection to the asserted claim.29 Such a view established a
flexible constitutional standard regarding personal jurisdiction that fo-

23. See id. at 52. InternationalShoe substitutes the presence of person or property
for minimum contacts under an overriding notion of fair play. Lilly, JurisdictionOver
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 88-89 (1983).
24. Martin, PersonalJurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872, 873
(1980). In addition to the due process clause, the full faith and credit clause also presents
a limit to jurisdiction. Id. at 873-74.
25. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
26. Id. at 221-22. The Texas corporation had assumed the insurance obligations of
an Arizona corporation which originally issued the policy. Id. at 221.
27. Id. at 222.
28. The company claimed that the covered party committed suicide, thus relieving
the company of its obligation to pay on the policy. Id. at 222. The plaintiff had sued
under California Insurance Code of 1953, §§ 1610-20, which permitted jurisdiction over
foreign corporations that had insurance contracts with residents even if service of process
could not be made within the state. Id. at 221.
29. Id. at 223. The Court further found that the contract had a substantial connection with California, and that it was not impaired by the effects of the jurisdictional
statute, which did not take effect until the Texas corporation assumed the obligation. Id.
at 223-24. See also Silberman, supra note 5, at 53 n.88; Note, The Applicability of
Shaffer to the Quasi-In-Rem Attachment of Foreigners' Assets, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAr'i. L. 393, 396 (1979) (California may assert jurisdiction over the insurer because of
substantial connections with the state and a legitimate interest of the state in regulating
solicitation of business by insurers).
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cuses more on the interests of the plaintiff than on fairness to the defendant.3 Under this concept, the quality and extent of contacts are basically
irrelevant to the constitutionality of an assertion of jurisdiction. 1
The Supreme Court withdrew somewhat from this extremely expansive view of jurisdiction less than a year after McGee. In Hanson v.
Denckla3 2 a revocable trust was established in Delaware by a woman
living in Pennsylvania, who subsequently moved to Florida.33 While living in Florida, she executed both an inter vivos instrument that was to
give beneficiaries $400,000 of trust property, and a will with a residuary
clause purporting to give to the beneficiaries all property over which she
retained an unexercised power of appointment at her death. 4 Upon her
death, the Florida Supreme Court declared the trust instrument invalid
and enforced the residuary clause of the will. 5 The Hanson Court, in
reversing the decision, held that Florida lacked in rem jurisdiction over
the trust and lacked personal jurisdiction over the trust company, leaving
the state's courts with power to assert jurisdiction only over the will.36
Because none of the trust assets were administered in Florida, and because the cause of action did not result from any act within that state,
the trust agreement lacked any connection whatsoever with the forum."
The message of Hanson was not that a defendant must have minimum
contacts for a forum validly to assert jurisdiction, but that there must "be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." 3'

30. See Lilly, supra note 23, at 90. McGee is distinguishable from other jurisdiction
cases because of the substantive nature of the claim involved. Claims on insurance contracts involve strong public policy elements that may override some jurisdictional
interests.
31. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 52 n.87.
32. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
33. Id. at 238-39.
34. Id. at 238.
35. Id. at 242-43. In invalidating the trust, the Florida Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction over the absent defendant based on the premise that the court had jurisdiction
to construe the will. Id. at 243.
36. Id. at 248-52. In addition, the court judged immaterial the fact that the settlor
and a majority of the beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida. Id. at 254.
37. Id. at 251.
38. Id. at 253. This divergence from the minimum contacts standard suggested the
possibility of a different jurisdictional standard-the requirement of acts by the defendant purposely availing himself of the forum. Note, supra note 29, at 396; Case Comment, supra note 17, at 614. The problem of such a standard is defining what will
constitute purposeful availment. Lilly, supra note 23, at 91-93.
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The cases above form a framework for analyzing the Supreme Court's
more recent decisions on the topic of jurisdiction: Shaffer v. Heitner,
Rush v. Savchuk, 9 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall.4" By keeping in mind the various principles, propositions, and
phrasing of these jurisdictional decisions, it is easier to understand just
what the constitutional standards for jurisdiction are at present, and to
recognize any inconsistencies that detract from the force of those
standards.
III.

THE MODERN ERA: JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS BEGINNING
WITH

A.

Shaffer v. Heitner

What Footnote 37 in Shaffer Says

Shaffer v. Heitner marked a dramatic change in jurisdiction analysis.
Suddenly, the inquiry focused not on form, but on substance.4 The
plaintiff in Shaffer, who was not a resident of Delaware, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in a court in that state. The complaint named a
corporation, a subsidiary, and twenty-eight current or past corporate officers as defendants."2 In this complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants violated corporate duties by engaging the corporation in activities in Oregon that resulted in corporate liability.4 3 The trial court entered an order sequestering Delaware property belonging to the defendants, all of whom were nonresidents. 44 Twenty-one defendants then
made a special appearance to ask that the service of process upon them
be quashed and that the sequestration order be vacated. These defendants argued that the sequestration procedure did not afford them due
process and that they did not have sufficient contacts with the state of
Delaware for that forum to exercise jurisdiction over them under International Shoe.45 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the sequestra39. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
40. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
41. Note, Jurisdiction Over Alien CorporationsAfter Shaffer v. Heitner, 10 LoY.
U. Cm. L.J. 739, 746 (1979).
42. 433 U.S. at 189-90.
43. Id. at 190. The Oregon activities resulted in the corporation being held liable for
damages in an antitrust action and also led to further actions against the corporation for
criminal contempt. Id.
44. Id. at 191. A sequestration order, as used in Delaware, was a process to compel
personal appearance of nonresident defendants to defend suits brought against them; it
could further provide for seizure of defendant's property to pay the plaintiff's demands if
the defendant failed to appear. Id. at 190 n.4 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366
(1975)).

45. Id. at 192-93.
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tion procedure did meet the requirements of due process.46 The court
held that jurisdiction was permissible because the plaintiff's cause of action was quasi in rem and was not based upon the contacts of any defendants with the forum."
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed in an opinion by
Justice Marshall, stating that the ability of a state to assert jurisdiction
over a nonresident must be evaluated according to the minimum-contacts
standard of InternationalShoe.4" To exercise in rem jurisdiction, a court
must find sufficient contacts to permit "jurisdiction over the interests of
persons in a thing."'49 For a quasi in rem action, the presence in a state
of property unrelated to a plaintiff's cause of action will not be sufficient
in and of itself to support that state's assertion of jurisdiction.50 Exercising jurisdiction grounded only on the physical location of property violates due process if the property is unrelated to the subject matter or
substance of the cause of action." The Court reconciled its decision with
Hanson, finding that the defendants had not "purposely avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,"
inasmuch as the corporate officers were not obligated to purchase interests in the corporation in order to occupy their offices. 2 However, the
Court firmly established that in evaluating the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with a forum state for the purposes of determining if juris-

46. Id. at 194. The lower courts determined that seizure of a nonresident's property
in Delaware pursuant to a court order, with the release of that property upon entry of
general appearance by the defendant provided an adequate basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 193-94.
47. Id. at 196.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, introduction note (1977)). Presence of property in a state is a consideration in the exercise of
jurisdiction, but it is not conclusive. Id. at 208.
50. Id. at 208-09. The Court rejected the argument that permitting the presence of
property alone to suffice for the assertion of jurisdiction is necessary in order to prevent
persons from avoiding obligations by removing assets to a place where they are not subject to in personam actions. The full faith and credit clause guards against such a actions.
Id. at 209-10.
51. Id. at 213. Also, jurisdiction could not be jusitfied by the state's interest in regulating the management of Delaware corporations, because the jurisdiction was based not
upon the defendant's status as a corporate fiduciary, but on the presence of defendants'
property within the state. Id. at 213-14.
52. Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). In other words, defendants otherwise without minimum contacts did not surrender their constitutional right to avoid jurisdiction by accepting their positions with the corporation. Id. Apparently, the International Shoe minimum-contacts test and the Hanson purposeful availment test co-exist as
independent valid jurisdictional standards.
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diction over him is proper, the correct test to apply is the minimumcontacts test from International Shoe.5 3

The foundation ot the proposed doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity is
contained in footnote 37 and the text that surrounds it. In the text just
prior to the footnote, the Court supported its choice of jurisdictional
standards by stating that "allowing in rem jurisdiction avoids the uncertainty inherent in the InternationalShoe standard and assures a plaintiff of a forum."5 4 The Court believed the "fairness... of [the] International Shoe standard can be easily applied in the vast majority of
cases." 55 Addressing the notion that the plaintiff is assured a forum, the
Court observed in footnote 37:
This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question
whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff. 6
While the Court does not officially recognize a jurisdiction by necesity doctrine, the fact that the issue was raised at all, especially as it
seems sua sponte, implies that the Court might well be receptive to a
judicially created jurisdiction open to deserving plaintiffs with no alternative. Subsequent language by the Court has further suggested a potential opening for the development and application of such a doctrine.
The concept of jurisdiction by necessity requires a relaxation of the
minimum contacts test of International Shoe under certain circumstances. 57 Under a necessity analysis, the relationship of defendant to forum is still relevant, but rather than a determination of sufficiency of the
defendant's contacts with the forum, the standard is one of "reasonableness." 58 A reasonableness analysis takes into account the interests of all

53. Id. at 211-12. See Note, supra note 29, at 398-99. A minimum contacts analysis
includes the following factors: the defendant's benefit from state protection of the property, the state interest in resolution of disputes, and the likelihood that records and documents are within the state. Case Comment, Exercise of In Rem and Quasi In Rem
JurisdictionJustified Only Where International Shoe Minimum Contacts Standard is
Satisfied, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 159, 164-65 n.33 (1978).
54. 433 U.S. at 211. For a detailed discussion of sequestration, see Folk & Moyer,
Sequestration in Delaware: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1973).

55.

433 U.S. at 211.

56. Id. at 211 n.37.
57. Footnote 37 implies, if there is to be a jurisdiction by necessity, that the Court
should require fewer contacts in the jurisdiction analysis when another forum is lacking,
perhaps giving a more generous recognition to constructive acts in a state. Note, supra
note 29, at 402.
58. Lilly, supra note 23, at 98-99.
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the litigants,"9 not merely the fairness to potential defendants considering
their actions and connections with the forum.6
B.

How Rush v. Savchuk Modifies Shaffer

Rush v. Savchuk stands for the proposition that a court must find
minimum contacts under International Shoe in order to exercise quasi
in rem jurisdiction over a defendant. 1 Savchuk was injured as a passenger in an automobile driven by Rush. 2 Both were Indiana residents and
the accident occurred in Indiana." Savchuk later moved to Minnesota
and brought suit there against Rush by attaching the duty of Rush's
insurer to defend and indemnify him in a suit." Savchuk asserted that
Minnesota courts had power to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction since
the insurer did business in Minnesota, even though Rush himself had no
contacts with the state of Minnesota. 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that such an exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was valid under
Shaffer."
The United States Supreme Court ruled to the contrary. Under the
Court's decision, a state may not properly exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks forum contacts by garnishing the responsibility of an insurer to defend and indemnify, even when the insurer is entitled to do, and actually does, business in the state.6 Instead,
the Court held, a court can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only
when that defendant has minimum contacts with the state under the InternationalShoe standard and when such an exercise comports with due
process considering "the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation."6' 8 In Rush the presence of property did not establish
59. Id. at 100.
60. Martin, supra note 24, at 879. Traditionally, the defendant's position has been
favored in court decisions governing jurisdiction, with authorities citing considerations
such as the burden of inconvenience and equal sovereignty of parties as justifications for
favoritism. Von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction:General Theories Compared and
Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279, 309-10 (1983).
61. 444 U.S. at 327.
62. Id. at 322.
63. Id.
64. Id. Savchuk was unable to bring a cause of action in Indiana because of a "guest
statute" which prohibited claims of passengers against the driver. Id.
65. Id. at 322-23.
66. Id. at 324. The court found the policy to be garnishable because, although the
cause of action arose outside Minnesota the plaintiff was a Minnesota resident at the
time suit was filed, and the interests of fairness supported exercise of jurisdiction. Id.
67. Id. at 320.
68. Id. at 327 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204).
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a relationship of sufficient strength to permit the Minnesota court to assert jurisdiction over an unrelated cause of action, especially since Rush
himself did not engage in any purposeful activity related to the forum.6 9
Jurisdiction over an individual cannot be achieved by jurisdiction over
his insurer and attachment of any policy proceeds-the "functional
equivalent" of a direct action. If the Constitution forbids jurisdiction over
the insured, then there is no basis for bringing the insurer into the action. 70 In the Court's words, a defendant must have "certain judicially
cognizable ties with a State" for that state's courts to exercise jurisdiction
71
over him.
This decision brought to an end the doctrine of Seider v. Roth, a case
from the New York state courts. 2 The Seider court considered contractual obligations of an insurance company to an insured to be a debt subject to attachment if the insurer did business within the state, and concluded that such attachments could provide a basis for jurisdiction over
the insured.7 ' A subsequent New York case, Simpson v. Loehmann, reaffirmed Seider, holding that such a procedure complied with the due
process interests of defendants because it was the insurer, not the insured, who controlled the litigation.7 4 Rush ended this practice, which
had served as an exception to the Shaffer standard, stressing that such a
contractual obligation fails to demonstrate any contact of the defendant
insured with the forum and relates only to the conduct of litigation, not
to the inherent ability of a court to decide the issues in a lawsuit."

69. Rush's only contact with Minnesota was an insurance policy with a company
doing business in the state, a contact the court considered insufficient and "adventitious."
Id. at 328-29. See, e.g., Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978);
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
70. 444 U.S. at 330-31.
71. Id. at 332. Admittedly, the reasoning of the Court at this point is somewhat
circular. See also Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction: A Reappraisal,59 N.C.L. REv. 429, 471 (1981) (judicially cognizable ties to the
state are necessary before other factors may be considered).
72. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
73. Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315. This concept relates back to Harris v. Balk and
the idea that presence of a debt within a state is sufficient for quasi in rem jurisdiction
over a defendant not present in the state. 444 U.S. at 325-26. See also Simpson v. Loehmann 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671 (1967).
74. Simpson, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672 (1967). "[W]here the plaintiff is
a resident of the forum state and the insurer is present in and regulated by it, the State
has a substantial and continuing relation with the controversy." Id. (quoted in Rush, 444
U.S. at 326).
75. 444 U.S. at 329. Rush further held that this type of jurisdiction is unconstitutional. Id. at 332-33. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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The impact of Rush upon footnote 37 of Shaffer is ambiguous and not
easy to measure. At first Rush appears to back away from any idea of a
jurisdiction by necessity, since it denies plaintiff a forum and restricts
assertion of jurisdiction to situations when there are "judicially cognizable ties with a state."71 6 However, the Rush Court restricted its decision
to actions in which the defendant has "never had any contacts with Minnesota."7 7 The Court did not state whether an assertion of jurisdiction
would be permissible when there are some contacts, or when it cannot be
said that there are no contacts whatsoever. The only guideline set by the
Court is the "fair play and substantial justice" standard of International
Shoe. What exact factors satisfy the requirements of due process when a
court claims personal jurisdiction over a defendant remains an open
question, but it appears that jurisdiction by necessity can coexist with the
rule of Rush, provided that some contact with the forum exists.7 8
C.

The Status of Footnote 37 After the Helicopteros Decision

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall represents a further movement toward the more restrictive end of the continuum of allowable jurisdiction. The lawsuit involved a wrongful death action filed
in a Texas state court against a Colombian corporation (Helicol).7 9 A
helicopter owned by the corporation crashed in Peru, killing some
United States citizens who were employed by a Peruvian business at the
time. The Peruvian business was part of a joint venture with WilliamsSedco-Horn, headquartered in Texas. 80 The joint venture had contracted
in Peru with Helicol for helicopter services.8"
Crucial to the Court's decision is its analysis of Helicol's contacts with
the United States, particularly Texas. Those contacts included:
[S]ending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiationsession; accepting into its New York bank account checks drawn on a
Houston bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services

76. Id. at 332. See also supra note 71.
77. Id. at 327.
78. The majority in Rush presupposes a method of determining the factors.
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,

1980 S. Or. REv. 77, 80.
79. 466 U.S. at 412.
80. Id. at 410. The Peruvian company was formed to permit the venturers to submit
a bid on and build a pipeline for the state-owned oil company of Peru. Peruvian law
required that the construction of the pipeline be done by a Peruvian company. Id.
81. Id. at 410-11. The contract provided that any disputes which arose would be
subject to jurisdiction of the courts of Peru. Id.
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from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums; and sending personnel to Bell's
facilities in Fort Worth for training.82
The Texas Supreme Court held these contacts sufficient for jurisdiction, 3 but the United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that
"Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas were insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."8' 4 In making this decision, the Court examined the various contacts individually. It held that the trip to Texas by executive personnel
was not so continuous or systematic a contact as to meet the requirements of InternationalShoe.8 5 The checks drawn from the Texas bank
were seen as a unilateral act at the discretion of the drawer and thus
irrelevant for determining sufficiency of contacts with the forum.8 6 The
purchases of helicopters and the training sessions were similarly discounted as too weak to permit a Texas court to acquire in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant for a cause of action unrelated to those
87
contacts.
In addition to its analysis of specific contacts, the Court directly addressed the possibility of jurisdiction by necessity and footnote 37 of
Shaffer. In a footnote to its opinion,88 the Court stated:
As an alternative to traditional minimum-contacts analysis, respondents
suggest that the Court hold that the State of Texas had personal jurisdiction over Helicol under a doctrine of "jurisdiction by necessity." We conclude, however, that respondents failed to carry their burden of showing
that all three defendants could not be sued together in a single forum. It is
not clear from the record, for example, whether suit could have been
brought against all three defendants in either Colombia or Peru. We decline to consider adoption of a doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity-a potentially far-reaching modification of existing law-in the absence of a

82. Id. at 416.
83. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.
1982); 466 U.S. at 413.
84. 466 U.S. at 418-19.
85. Id. at 416. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
445 (1952) (contacts must be of a "continuous and systematic" nature).
86. 466 U.S. at 416-17. See also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; Lilly, supra note 23, at
99.
87. 466 U.S. at 417. The Court relied on Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260
U.S. 516 (1923) (cited in InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 318), which stands for the
position that some single or occasional acts in a state that may be sufficient to impose

liability do not necessarily give a court authority to enforce a judgment. Similarly,
purchases by a defendant are not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 466 U.S. at 417-18 &

n.12.
88. 466 U.S. at 419 n.13.
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more complete record."9

There are several possible implications of this footnote. The Court seems
to be considering necessity jurisdiction in this case as an alternative to
the minimum-contacts analysis, instead of as a type of minimum contactsY0 The Court also states that while the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden of justifying jurisdiction in Helicopteros, the Court might be
willing to adopt a different jurisdictional test in situations in which a
plaintiff could not sue all defendants in a single forum. 1 However, because of the potential scope and impact of such a doctrine, the Court
evaded the question by choosing to wait until some future case to decide
whether to recognize a jurisdiction by necessity.
While Helicopteros moved closer to confronting jurisdiction by necessity, there are many open questions surrounding the concept. The Court
did not intimate what factors might influence it to adopt such a doctrine
other than the unavailability of a single forum in which all defendants
could be joined. Also, it is unclear whether a necessity analysis would
proceed under the traditional framework of InternationalShoe and its
progeny, or whether the Court would establish a separate standard to
assure that potential defendants' due process rights are observed and
honored.
IV.

THE OPPOSING VIEWS OF JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY

The doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity is designed to address the
problem that arises when a cause of action does not have a relationship
with a forum sufficient to permit an assertion of jurisdiction under International Shoe, but the interests of justice would best be served by allowing the action to proceed in that forum. When this situation arises, a
necessity doctrine would permit the court to assert jurisdiction and provide an arena for resolution of the dispute between the parties. A premise of this concept is that there is not, or it is unlikely that there is,
another forum available which could properly handle the claim. A
proper assertion of necessity jurisdiction also requires that it not be unreasonable to require the defendant to defend himself in the forum. Last,
even though contacts are not totally sufficient under the traditional standard, there must be some logical connection between the cause of action

89. Id. at 419 n.13 (citation omitted).
90. Id.
91. The Court stated that it was unclear from the record whether the plaintiff could
bring the action anywhere else. The Court suggested that it would address the concept if
a more complete record were established in some future case. Id.
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and the forum. These premises raise questions: Why should a plaintiff
not be allowed to bring suit when otherwise he may be denied a remedy
entirely? Do "fair play and substantial justice" apply only to
defendants?
A.

The Case For Assertion of Necessity Jurisdiction

Proponents of necessity jurisdiction assert as the base of their theory
the notion that a plaintiff should not be denied his day in court. The
traditional rule requires a plaintiff to pursue a defendant in the defendant's forum, actorforum rei sequitur.92 Historically, courts have favored
the defendant in matters of forum selection, citing the burdens of inconvenience, travel, cost, and the equal sovereignty of the plaintiff and defendant. 93 An equally convincing argument may be advanced for favoring the plaintiff, however, because he is the party that is injured. 4
Justice Brennan has even suggested that the concept of forcing a plaintiff
to seek out the defendant is outmoded in our modern economy, in which
business people and others are constantly on the move and travel is easy
and frequently relatively inexpensive.9 5
In determining a plaintiff's real ability to receive his day in court, it is
essential to recognize that a delineation of plaintiffs and defendants into
classes is not only helpful, but strikes close to the heart of the issue. A
major factor in establishing such classes is the relative economic position

92. See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1127 n.13 (1966) (the plaintiff must pursue the
defendant in this forum); von Mehren, supra note 60, at 310 (courts tend to favor a
defendant when determining jurisdiction).
93. Von Mehren, supra note 60, at 310. Technological advances do tend to nullify
arguments advanced by either side that the economic costs favor compelling the other
party to travel, because those advances aid each side equally. Louis, The Grasp of Long
Arm JurisdictionFinally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 429-30 (1980).
94. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 92, at 1167. Favoring the plaintiff is
logical and advantageous as a matter of social welfare. See Kalo, Jurisdiction as an
Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles,
1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1186. This is especially true of tort actions. Under a foreseeability analysis, the defendant can reasonably expect lawsuits as a business matter, while the
plaintiff has no similar expectation of injury. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
92, at 1167.
95. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 308 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting to World-Wide Volkswagen and Rush). Justice Brennan in
Helicopteros would have asserted jurisdiction over nonresident defendants on the basis of
fairness and reasonableness to the defendant. 166 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also von Mehren, supra note 60, at 309.

416

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:401

of the parties, or the ability of each to bear the financial burden of the
lawsuit.96 This sort of analysis is of considerable import when the plaintiff is an individual and the defendant is a large corporation, especially
when the action is brought in the plaintiff's own forum.9 7 In this situation it seems appropriate to reverse the traditional preference. Conversely, when the plaintiff is a large diverse entity but the defendant is
an individual, there is no compelling reason for the plaintiff's home state
to assert jurisdiction. 98
The presence of multiple parties and parties of diverse nationality is
an additional relevant consideration. In international litigation it may be
impossible to gain jurisdiction over all the defendants in one forum.9 9
One jurisdiction should be able to adjudicate the cause of action in its
entirety; aside from logic, this serves both judicial economy and the individual economies of those parties who would have to make appearances
in more than one lawsuit, were the dispute to be tried in sundry forums. 10 0 United States courts making such an analysis should consider
distinctions between a United States citizen as plaintiff and a foreign
plaintiff. This is not to encourage or applaud prejudice in favor of
United States citizens, but to deny jurisdiction where many or all defendants are foreign nationals may leave the domestic plaintiff with neither
relief nor an alternative forum to enter, serving neither justice nor the
national interest.1 " These considerations require a movement away from
a minimum contacts standard to a "minimal contacts" analysis in cases
in which a defendant purposely avails himself of privileges within the
forum.1 0 2 In this scenario, an isolated transaction will be sufficient to
support the assertion of jurisdiction.01
The doctrine of forum non conveniens supports jurisdiction by neces-

96. Von Mehren, supra note 60, at 311.
97. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 92, at 1167-68. This Note addresses only
this narrow situation and does not suggest a reversal of the traditional bias in favor of the
defendant for all situations.
98. Id. at 1168. The traditional bias in favor of the defendant should be reversed
only for compelling considerations. Id. at 1169.
99. Id. at 1153. The complexity of the problem is further frustrated when the litigation involves both corporations and persons. Id.
100. See id. at 1154. In cases involving multiple parties, jurisdiction should lie with
the forum providing the most appropriate focus to give a unified decision. Id. at 1162-63.
101. See generally id. at 1163. The differences in plaintiffs' rights from country to
country are numerous and intricate. In some countries animosity toward the United
States could render fair and just adjudication impossible, even if the United States citizen
were to procure professional services.
102. Kalo, supra note 94, at 1192.
103. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 92, at 1148-49.
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sity by providing a safeguard against potential abuses or misapplication
of that jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens allows a court properly to
dismiss suits that are otherwise within its jurisdiction.' When another
forum is available to adjudicate the suit and the plaintiff's choice of jurisdiction is somewhere between inappropriate and oppressive, the court
has the option of dismissing the action.'0 5 A court has the power to utilize administrative considerations in accepting or denying jurisdiction."'0
Any decision on forum non conveniens grounds is entirely discretionary
in nature and the court may balance a multitude of factors in making its
decision.

10 7

Factors that a court considers in a forum non conveniens analysis include convenience to both the parties and the court, the ability of the
court to enforce its remedies, and the capacity of the court to give a fair
and just trial of the matter.' 08 The convenience consideration addresses
general fairness to the parties in requiring them to litigate in the particular forum, with citizenship as a particularly important consideration."0 9
Whether the parties are domestic or foreign will, of course, weigh heavily in this analysis." 0 Considering the court's ability to enforce remedies
confronts practical problems of collecting a judgment or policing an injunction."' Obtaining a judgment and recovering it from the losing party

104. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal
Courts, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Forum Non Conveniens]; Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited: A Decade of Development of
the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 755, 755 (1977) [hereinafter Note, The Convenient Forum
Abroad Revisited].
105. Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 373. See Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited, supra note 104, at 756.
106. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 376. Because of the
amorphous standards used in exercising the doctrine, any attempt to catalogue all factors
is virtually impossible. Id.
107. Id.
108. Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 381-84. See generally Case
Comment, Alien Defendants in Federal Question Actions - FederalDistrict Courts May
Look at Alien Defendant's Aggregate Contacts with the United States in Deciding
Whether to Exercise In PersonamJurisdiction,9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (1976).
109. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 381.
110. Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited, supra note 104, at 778. Under
this concept, if an alien sues a defendant of the United States, the defendant's request
will be accorded greater deference than would the request of an alien defendant being
sued by an American plaintiff. In the latter situation, a forum non conveniens decision
could be the equivalent of a decision on the merits against the plaintiff. Id. at 778-79. See
also supra note 101.
111. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 376. It is questionable
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are distinct concepts with different standards and divergent rates of success."' 2 Determining the adequacy of a foreign court involves examining
both the availability and the capability of that court to handle the
case.' While these interests are usually balanced, the plaintiff's choice
of forum is generally accorded a great deal of deference by the court.1 4
The use of forum non conveniens would complement any broadening
of the traditional scope of assertion of jurisdiction, so that jurisdiction is
permitted only when "notions of fair play and substantial justice" dictate, and courts are kept within the defined bounds of due process. 1 5
The Supreme Court has not addressed the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but the weight of authority holds that federal law, not state law,
governs the decision." 8 The doctrine allows a case-by-case analysis, with
decisions made on the merits of each suit."17 Although using forum non

conveniens as a part of the jurisdiction by necessity analysis blurs the
distinction between jurisdiction and forum non conveniens (which is,
technically, a "venue" consideration), the approach allows courts to
make an equitable inquiry into the matter of which court is best qualified to adjudicate the controversy."'
Recognition of jurisdiction by necessity also has the potential for a
positive impact on international transactions. A pattern of more aggressive assertion of jurisdiction would promote the practice of inserting forum-selection clauses in contracts to designate where any disputes that
arise will be resolved. If such clauses have been fairly bargained for and
they do not violate United States public policy, they will be enforced
provided that the forum designated in the contract has jurisdiction over
the matter.11 9 If courts uphold these clauses by accepting jurisdiction

whether enforcement of judgment should even enter a jurisdiction analysis.
112. See generally id.
113. Id. at 383. The court must determine whether the foreign tribunal is competent
to find the facts, to apply the law, to comply with contemporary United States notions of
procedural and substantive fairness, and to provide a mechanism to give the plaintiff a
recovery should he deserve one. Id. at 384.
114. Id. at 376. Unless the balance weighs very heavily in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed. See Note, The Convenient Forum
Abroad Revisited, supra note 104, at 756 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 508 (1947)).
115. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REv. 657, 658 (1959).
116. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 380 n.50.
117. Id. at 393.
118. Traynor, supra note 115, at 663-64. In applying this type of analysis the traditional labels of in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem jurisdiction become irrelevant. See
id. at 663.
119. Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited, supra note 104, at 763.

1988]

JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY

otherwise lacking if necessity so requires, the selection of forum will become an important issue in international agreements, allowing parties to
resolve jurisdictional matters at their discretion. 20 Courts will retain the
power to deny effect to these clauses if the forum does not "serve the
'
convenience of parties and the ends of justice." 121
In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. the Supreme Court recognized the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in international agreements. Such clauses are binding unless an attacking party can prove that
enforcement would be unfair.' 22 In Bremen a German corporation contracted with a United States corporation to tow a drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy. 2'3 The contract offered by the German company contained
clauses requiring all disputes to be settled before the London Court of
Justice and exculpating the company from liability for any damages in
towing. The United States company accepted the contract, making several alterations in it, but not changing the forum-selection and exculpatory provisions. 2 4 Early in the journey, when the ship had not yet
cleared the international waters of the Gulf of Mexico, a storm caused
serious damage to the rig, and the ship was forced to port at Tampa.'2 5
The United States corporation brought suit in the United States against
the German corporation for negligent towage in violation of the contract
clauses.1 2 6 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction proper in the United States, stating that choice of forum clauses
will not be enforced unless the selected forum is more convenient. 27
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that forum-selection clauses are
valid and that they should be enforced unless unreasonable. 2 a The traditional hostility to such clauses was rejected, and the Court enunciated

120. See, e.g., id. at 762. However, there are constraints upon the freedom of parties
to select a forum, so the court is not absolutely bound by the contract. For instance, the
selection of a forum completely unrelated to the entire transaction is not worthy of automatic court approval. Id. at 763.
121. Id. at 765 (quoting Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted)).

122. 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
123. Id. at 2. The domestic company accepted bids on the job and the German corporation's was lowest. Id.
124. Id. at 2-3.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 3-4. The German corporation moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
and filed its own suit with the London Court. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 7. Although the rig was in international waters when it was damaged, the
United States courts were found to be most convenient under the circumstances. Id.
128. Id. at 10.
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several factors relevant in deciding whether to enforce such clauses.1 2
The Bremen Court then went on to find that the balance of factors was
not so heavily against the forum-selection clause as to render it unenforceable. Such clauses are advantageous because "[t]he elimination of
...uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both
parties is an indispensable element [of] international trade." 3 It is clear
that the use of forum-selection clauses promotes international transactions, since parties can now (after Bremen) agree in advance just where
the consequences of their actions will be determined, and, in addition,
stand an enhanced chance of knowing what law and scheme of interpretation will be applied to their contract.
The use of necessity jurisdiction as a backup to forum-selection clauses
is critical to protect the expectations of parties to an agreement. With a
forum-selection clause, the plaintiff should be assured of a day in court
in a forum to which he consented. But the passage of time or a change in
governmental regime can make the chosen forum entirely unreasonable.
The Court, in Bremen, protected United States parties by observing that
a forum-selection clause would be unenforceable in such an instance. 3 1
Necessity jurisdiction would thus promote world trade without upsetting
the planning of either a plaintiff or a defendant and without allowing
one party to take advantage of some radical shift in a forum's judicial
philosophy. Parties to a contract who become entangled in a dispute
must find a forum if the free flow of commerce, goods, and currency is to
be maintained.
The type and nature of the available forum are also factors in a plaintiff's ability to truly receive a fair day in court. Although a forum may
be in some sense open and available, as a matter of procedural and substantive reality a party may still be unable to rest assured of a fair determination of his cause of action. Foreign tribunals may lack the capability
to deal with complex or esoteric litigation, and from a political standpoint they may be so antagonistic toward the United States and its citizens as to effectively deny a remedy to a United States plaintiff.13 2 While

129. Id. at 10-11. Those factors include a determination as to whether the forum
choice in the contract was the result of an arm's length negotiation and whether enforcing the clause would contravene public policy. Id. at 12, 15.
130. Id. at 13. The Court found that the clause was vital to the formation of the
contract, as it reflected the parties' arm's-length negotiations. Id. at 14.
131. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Mobile Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614-15
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966) (forum non conveniens denied because of
inadequate foreign procedures). Cf Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at
387.
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each country's legal system has various attributes conducive to fact-finding, there are a variety of social and political influences which can act
against the unwary or inexperienced United States litigant.1 33 For example, the court system in a socialist country may be more concerned with
protecting the state structure than with fairness to the commercial interests of a capitalist plaintiff. Similarly, the jurisprudence of Third World
nations may be heavily and noticeably influenced by extra-judicial considerations-such as ritual and religion-which have become submerged
in Western legal culture."
B.

The Case Against Assertion of Necessity Jurisdiction

Those who oppose the emergence of a jurisdiction by necessity doctrine assert that plaintiffs are not being denied their day in court under
the present jurisdictional methodology, if indeed they are entitled to a
day in court at all. The Constitution does not give plaintiffs a right of
access to the federal courts.1 5 Article IV of the Constitution, which provides for privileges of citizenship, does not list as one of those privileges
an absolute right to file a lawsuit. 3 6 As Justice Holmes stated: "[I]t
should be remembered that parties do not enter into civil relations in
foreign jurisdictions in reliance upon our courts. They could not complain if our courts refused to meddle with their affairs and remitted them
to the place that established and would enforce their rights."1 3
Many of the arguments suggested by proponents of the development of
a necessity jurisdiction as reasons to compel the defendant to go to the
plaintiff's chosen forum may be turned on their heads and used as arguments for maintaining the current standards. Technological advancements that have decreased the burdens of travel and increased the convenience of appearing before a court and have simplified communication
apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants. Traditionalists argue that it
would be illogical to assume that it is more convenient for the defendant
133. While fairness and equity may be achieved through any number of different
legal systems, language may prove a formidable barrier. Interpretation of law and agreements can be extremely difficult when various languages are involved. R. SCHLESINGER,
H. BAAD, M. DAMASKA, & P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW 868-72 (1988).
134. See generally 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: THEIR COMPARISON AND UNIFICATION (1975); LAW
AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF NATIONS

(C. Rhyne 3d rev. ed. 1978).

135. Federal courts were not established to benefit a United States citizen in every
situation; rather, they were established to protect foreign parties from the bias of state
courts. Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 390-91.

136.
137.

Id. at 389 n.80, 390.
Id. at 390 (quoting Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 480 (1912)).
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to come to the plaintiff than for the plaintiff to seek out the defendant."' 8
The costs of out-of-town litigation should be substantially the same for
either party, regardless of who does the travelling.' The basic premise
that the defendant should come to the injured party's forum ignores the
fact that there must be a judicial determination of the defendant's liability before the plaintiff's claim is legally recognized."'4 In other words,
the equities of jurisdiction cannot be placed categorically on the side of
plaintiffs. Additionally, considerations such as these should be given only
minimal attention so long as a forum is available to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim, whether or not the plaintiff is comfortable with the courthouse and local law. It is the availability of this forum that is the important test.
Opponents also assert that confusion over jurisdiction will increase
greatly under a necessity doctrine, which requires courts to engage in a
balancing and weighing of the particular interests of the parties instead
of a determination of minimum contacts.' 4 ' A balancing approach places
all jurisdiction questions upon a continuum, complicates the review of
each case, and establishes a long list of decisions without much precedential value.' 4 2 The current approach, which sets a threshold of contacts
for the assertion of jurisdiction that clearly complies with due process
and which provides a test that is readily applicable, does not do any
constitutional injustice to the plaintiff.'4 3 Should courts begin to use a
balancing approach, it is a distinct possibility that the state courts would
tend to resolve doubts in favor of the assertion of jurisdiction, instead of
maintaining an impartial position." Since the majority of plaintiffs and
interests are served under the present minimum contacts analysis, it is
better to maintain a standard that meets the fundamental fairness requirement of the fifth amendment, rather than institute a standard that
could throw the orderly determination of jurisdiction into disarray.""
Further problems arise when courts attempt to divide plaintiffs and

138.
139.

Louis, supra note 93, at 429.
Id. Further, in many instances, making the defendant come to the plaintiff

could force the defendant to appear in unlimited fora.
140. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 78.
141. Louis, supra note 93, at 432 (judical review complicated because of the multitude of relevant factors).
142. Id. It is questionable, though, whether the current system in the United States
produces much precedent of value.
143. See Louis, supra note 93, at 430-32 (justice is usually served by a mechanical
test).

144. Id.
145. See Brilmayer, supra note 78, at 105-06.
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defendants into various categories, and then use the categories to determine the results of the jurisdictional analysis. One type of distinction-whether the plaintiff is domestic or foreign-results in a direct
prejudice against defendants sued by United States plaintiffs. 4 6 Instead
of providing an arena equally protective of all, courts in the United
States are more inclined to accept jurisdiction for a domestic plaintiff
than for a foreign one. 147 If courts employ this provincial approach, defendants may be prejudiced not by their nationality, but by that of their
accusers.
Another distinction-whether the plaintiff or defendant is a corporation or an individual-can result in misguided advantages to parties."4 8
Simply because a defendant is a corporation does not mean it is better
able to defend itself in the plaintiff's forum, even if the plaintiff is an
individual.' 49 To properly use this "means-test" type of distinction,
courts would have to make an economic and personal evaluation of each
plaintiff and defendant to assure an accurate analysis. It is unclear how
courts would be guided in choosing which factors should fit within this
type of analysis. The process can only become more complicated when
there are multiple parties to the action. 50 In support of the current approach is the argument that since the plaintiff wants to upset the status
quo, he should be required to seek out the defendant to gain a remedy.
The necessity-jurisdiction proponent's analysis includes examining the
adequacy of the foreign tribunal and casting a general doubt upon the
ability of foreign courts to handle complex issues. However, any assumption that foreign courts are deficient in their ability to handle a situation
or to remain impartial is incorrect.'" A simple difference in rules and
procedures without some additional evidence suggesting an inherent unfairness should not be sufficient to permit a United States court to assert
its jurisdiction. 2 In fact, there are many instances when a foreign tribunal will be better suited to handle a particular claim. The foreign tribunal may be more convenient for handling the litigation because of the

146. Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 393.
147. See Louis, supra note 93, at 430.
148. See supra note 99.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. To assert jurisdiction in some of the
multiple-party cases would leave nothing of the protections of due process. See generally
Louis, supra note 93.
151. Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 385.
152. As long as a foreign court has jurisdiction without a showing of fraud,
prejudice, or discriminatory procedures, the jurisdiction should not be questioned. However, this does not mean that some countries should not be above suspicion. Id. at 385-87.

424

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:401

location of the parties and the evidence, or because of its familiarity with
15 3
the applicable law.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is, at best, an uncertain factor
within any necessity analysis. The doctrine of forum non conveniens can
apply only when there are at least two appropriate fora and the court
making the analysis has jurisdiction over the cause of action.15 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the availability of a
second forum does not guarantee the application of law favorable to one
party. 155 Forum non conveniens, if utilized, further limits the ability of a
plaintiff to forum-shop and negates any argument that the characteristics
of the substantive law of the foreign tribunal should enter into the juris15
dictional analysis.
The requirements of forum non conveniens cannot be reconciled with
the necessity-jurisdiction proponent's position. If a necessity analysis is to
apply, there cannot be more than one appropriate forum available, and
the danger that allowing permissive jurisdiction will promote forum
shopping must be present. The doctrine of forum non conveniens safeguards against the problems presented by inappropriate fora and forum
shopping.157 One effect of the "necessity" approach is a substitution of
jurisdictional analysis for the forum non conveniens analysis."5 8 Within a
forum non conveniens analysis, an almost automatic acceptance of jurisdiction over the action occurs. Thus, the plaintiff is encouraged to attempt suit in the forum with the most favorable law, instead of in the
most appropriate court.
The seminal decision providing guidance in the forum non conveniens
doctrine is Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.15 9 The Court in Gulf Oil held that
transfer of causes through forum non conveniens is entirely at the discretion of the trial court, and provided a list of private and public interest
153. Id. at 387.
154. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens in the Absence of an Alternative Forum, 86
COLuM L. REV. 1000, 1008 (1986).
155. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981). In other words, if another
court takes jurisdiction, one cannot assume it will be partisan toward the defendant.
156. See Note, supra note 154, at 1006.
157. Id.
158. And if parties previously selected a forum through use of a forum-selection
clause, a forum non conveniens analysis would substitute its decision for what the parties
negotiated. This would encourage parties to disregard their contractual obligations and
seek the most advantageous forum. See Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited,
supra note 104, at 763.
159. 330 U.S. 501. Plaintiff brought suit in New York over an explosion and fire to
a warehouse in Virginia. He alleged the defendant was negligent in the delivery of gasoline, resulting in the fire. Id. at 502-03.
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factors for use in a balancing test.' The precedential force of this decision, however, is uncertain because an alternative forum was, in fact,
present. 6 Any discussion about the need of a second available forum for
the application of the doctrine was merely dicta. In a situation in which
two forums are open to the plaintiff, the question becomes at what point
such a balancing test is applicable. The basis for the balancing test is not
clear, since no constitutional source was given by the Court. Following
the issuance of Gulf Oil, lower courts have steadily approved its theory
of forum non conveniens. Some courts have given the doctrine a constitutional basis through the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments."6 2
Using forum non conveniens to deal with international lawsuits is an
application of the doctrine for a purpose opposite to that for which it
was intended. Such an application protects United States plaintiffs from
the potential bias of courts of other nations, rather than protecting foreign parties from the bias of state courts.' 6 3 No party coming into court
is ever guaranteed the fullest possible extension of due process. Instead,
"[t]here may only be a denial of due process when that process which
64
should be accorded, under those circumstances, is denied."'
The argument that expanding the range of cases where jurisdiction is
accepted will enhance international transactions by increasing the use of
forum-selection clauses lacks merit. It is only logical that foreign individuals or corporations facing a greater chance of being hauled into a
United States court, perhaps regarding an isolated action involving facts
not entirely within their control, might well decrease their rate of investment here. Foreign parties will likely be reluctant to involve themselves

160. Id. at 508. These factors include:
[R]elative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive.
Id.
161. Virginia was an alternative forum. The plaintiff resided there, the defendant
was qualified to do business there, and the cause of action arose there. Id. at 502-03;
Note, supra note 154, at 1004.
162. See, e.g., Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910, 915 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affd, 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62
N.Y.2d 474, 483, 467 N.E.2d 245, 250, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 602 (1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1108 (1985).
163. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 390.
164. Note, supra note 41, at 760 n.124 (emphasis omitted) (construing Board of
Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978)).
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in the United States economy without a sufficient indication of what
repercussions their actions will have. Unpredictable jurisdiction might
well prove discouraging enough to slow the rate of foreign investment.
Necessity jurisdiction could reduce forum-selection clauses to meaningless words. Parties will not be able to rely on the clauses, and will be
deterred from using forum-selection clauses. In a tight quid pro quo negotiation, a party will not make concessions in return for a choice of
forum unless confident that the clause is enforceable. Furthermore, businesses engaging in international trade should accept the risks inherent in
dealing with volatile governments. A business can protect itself against
potentially unfavorable forum-selection clauses by choosing a forum located in a nation with a stable government.
V.

THE ELEMENTS OF A JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY ANALYSIS

If the Supreme Court were to recognize jurisdiction by necessity, what
considerations would be taken into account in the standard of review it
promulgates? Part III of this Note explored the pros and cons of necessity jurisdiction, and the factors discussed there could be aspects of such
a standard of review, particularly the forum non conveniens consideration. There are several crucial elements that a court must consider in
determining a standard for jurisdiction by necessity.
The following is a typical situation in which the prospect of jurisdiction by necessity may arise. Assume a United States citizen brings suit
on a contract with a foreign corporation for services to be provided in the
foreign country. The parties negotiated the contract in the United States
without a clause stating what the applicable law would be, and there is a
failure to perform under the contract in that country. The defendant
makes occasional purchases in and visits to the United States, and owns
property scattered about the country. This is basically the Helicopteros
situation except that the plaintiff's case in Helicopteros was based in tort
and foreign law was held applicable. In addition, assume the available
foreign forum is in a country openly antagonistic toward the United
States, and whose judicial system lacks the procedural and substantive
protections generally afforded by United States courts, such that, in effect, there is no available alternative forum. Further, assume the properly applicable law is that of the United States, and, should the court
render a judgment, the plaintiff may be able to secure at least part of the
judgment from property located within the United States. This property
is wholly unrelated to the cause of action. Finally, the record is fully
developed to reflect all these facts.
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A.

Aggregate Contacts Instead of Minimum Contacts

Since Shaffer, all courts must use the standard set out in International Shoe and its progeny for determining whether to assert jurisdiction. 65 These cases established a boundary that maintained due process
while maximizing a court's opportunity to take and hold jurisdiction.
Examining a defendant's contacts with a particular forum poses no
problems for actions between citizens of the United States. The contacts
of a foreign defendant, however, may be so widely and thinly scattered
that it would be almost impossible for him to have established sufficient
minimum contacts with one state to allow any court to assert jurisdiction.166 Thus, a necessary element of any jurisdiction by necessity analysis is an aggregation of contacts: an examination of the contacts of a
foreign defendant to the United States as a whole, instead of contacts to
one particular forum state.167 Aggregation does not offend the Constitution. A court's power to aggregate emanates from the power of Congress
to assert jurisdiction over persons within the United States. 6 8 Even with
aggregation, the defendant is guaranteed any fifth amendment due process rights to which he may be entitled, while the plaintiff is afforded a
better chance to have his cause of action recognized, evaluated, and
tried." 9
A federal court officially recognized aggregation of contacts in Cryomedics Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd. 17 0 In Cryomedics a foreign corporation
manufactured and sold products to distributors in the United States, who
then sold those products to individual parties.' 7 ' The plaintiff, a United
States company, brought a patent infringement suit against a foreign
corporation in federal court in Connecticut. The defendant corporation
moved to dismiss, claiming its contacts with the forum were insufficient
for the court to exercise jurisdiction under the prevalent analysis.' 72 The
court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that in personam jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant is appropriate when an aggregation of his con165.

433 U.S. at 186.

166. Lilly, supra note 23, at 116-17.
167. Id. at 117.
168. See id. at 129. This concept harkens back to the territory or power principle of
jurisdiction where a sovereign had control over all persons or property within its borders.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
169. See Note, supra note 29, at 415-16.
170. 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). See also Case Comment, supra note 108, at
436-38 (analysis of Cyromedics and development of aggregate contracts).
171. 397 F. Supp. at 287-88.
172. Id. at 288. Plaintiff advanced the argument that the defendant's aggregate contacts to the United States could be evaluated. Id. at 289.
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tacts reveals a sufficient basis to accord with the requirements of fifth
amendment due process."' 3 Basing its decision on the notion that the territorial limits of the arm of government which is asserting jurisdiction
should determine the extent of that jurisdiction rather than the geographical extent of the state where the court is located, the court stated
that in federal question suits the United States is the entity with which a
defendant must have sufficient contacts. 174 Here, of course, the "arm" of
reference is the judicial branch'of the United States government, so it is
contacts with the United States as a whole which the court ought to
consider in determining the propriety of asserting jurisdiction. The court,
however, distinguished federal question actions from diversity actions,
concluding that federal question actions are unique to United States jurisdiction and particularly appropriate for utilizing an aggregation of
75

contacts.1

In some areas, Congress has prescribed when a foreign sovereign may
be sued and when an aggregation of contacts is mandated.' 76 For example, the heavy increase in foreign and domestic involvement in international trade has caused Congress to shift the protection for other nations
in United States courts from an absolute sovereign immunity to a restrictive immunity by passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).'" The FSIA contains procedural and substantive rules governing suits against foreign governments. 17 When a foreign sovereign is
sued under the FSIA, the court must evaluate that sovereign's contacts
with the entire United States to determine the general fairness and con79
stitutionality of accepting jurisdiction under due process.'

173. Id, at 290. Along with a sufficient quantity of contacts, there must be adequate
service of process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But beyond this, the only
limit to accepting jurisdiction is the looming threat of forum non conveniens. Id. See also
von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 92, at 1123-25 n.6.
174. See 397 F. Supp. at 291; Case Comment, supra note 108, at 442-43. Important
to the court's analysis was the foreseeability of defendant's contacts to the forum, which
included a non-manufacturing license the defendant had in the state of Connecticut. 397
F. Supp. at 291; Case Comment, supra note 108, at 442 n.33.
175. 397 F. Supp. at 291-92. Logically, whether or not it is a federal question action, as long as there is a foreign defendant, the defendant's contacts should be
aggregated.
176. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1982).
177. Lilly, supra note 23, at 119-21.
178. Id. at 120-21. For a detailed discussion of the FSIA and its development, see
Special Issue: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Ten Years Later, 19 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1986) (compilation of articles addressing interpretations and implementations of the FSIA).
179. Lilly, supra note 23, at 121-22.
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While Cryomedics and the FSIA are the only two times that an aggregation of contacts approach has been recognized as appropriate, these
two efforts suggest an increased willingness of United States courts and
the United States Congress to expand the scope of permissible jurisdiction. Aggregation is a positive way to expand jurisdiction without offending the dictates of due process. But given the potential sensitivity of any
situation involving foreign parties, legislative investigation and research
fully exploring the implications of all actions involving international parties would be preferable to any substantial expansion of jurisdiction by
judicial tribunals lacking the benefit of Congressional data-gathering resources. Following such investigation and research, Congress can intelligently limit a court's ability to assert jurisdiction and address issues such
as service of process, which are particularly important when a court
seeks to assert jurisdiction. Foreign parties are thus protected from a
state's overreaching and given meaningful due process protection under
the fifth amendment. Any new legislation should not contravene International Shoe, as long as it is developed with full respect for fourteenth
amendment due process rights."1 0
B.

Choice of Law

The interplay between jurisdiction and choice of law is quite relevant
to a consideration of jurisdiction by necessity. The two concepts are not,
and should not be mistaken as, interchangeable. Jurisdiction concerns
the ability of a court to exercise its power to adjudicate a case, while
choice of law governs the substantive law that will apply to resolve the
issues of the case.181 In most cases, the proper jurisdiction and chosen
law will be of the same forum. Situations exist, however, in which a
court may properly assert jurisdiction, while not applying its own law.
This may occur when personal jurisdiction is based on a defendant's individual contacts with the forum, while the cause of action is based on an
incident or occurrence not taking place within the forum."8 In this situation, some state long-arm statutes allow the forum with jurisdiction to
apply its own law automatically.' 8 3
The United States Supreme Court drew a distinction between an as180.

326 U.S. at 313, 316. See Lilly, supra note 23, at 148. See generally XXTH
(K. Nadelmann, A. von Mehren & J.
1961).
See Sedler, JudicialJurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of
v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031 (1978)
Id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1032.

CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW

Hazard
181.
Shaffer
182.
183.

430

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:401

sertion of jurisdiction and the application of a forum's own law in Hanson.18 As Chief Justice Warren stated:
[The state] does not acquire.., jurisdiction by being the "center of gravity" of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The
issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case
by considering the acts of the trustee. As we have indicated, they are insufficient to sustain the jurisdiction."8 5
In the Court's logic, while a forum may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, it does not automatically have the right to apply its
own law.18 6
In practice, jurisdiction and choice of law are so aligned that the majority of forums do apply their own law once they have accepted jurisdiction.18 7 This suggests that courts may generally decide jurisdiction cases
by first deciding which substantive law should apply to yield a desirable
result, then interpreting procedural law so as to allow the application of
the chosen substantive law. 88 However, such matters of convenience and
good intentions should not govern a court's choice of law or determination of jurisdiction."8 As declared in Fuentes v. Shevin:190
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests
of the person whose possessions are about to be taken.
"The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were

184. 357 U.S. 235. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text; Silberman, supra
note 5, at 82-84. But see Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the
In PersonamJurisdictionOf State Courts, From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U.
CM.L. REv. 569, 621-23 (1958) (criticizing Hanson as still applying territorial limits

to state power).
185.
186.
187.

357 U.S. at 254 (footnote omitted).
Id. See Sedler, supra note 181, at 1032.
Sedler, supra note 181, at 1031. See generally Sedler, The Governmental Inter-

est Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformation, 25 UCLA L.

Rv.

181, 227-33 (1977). Courts apply their own law as a matter of policy, to reflect the
concerns and objectives underlying that law.
188. Sedler, supra note 181, at 1034.
189. An "interests analysis" approach to choice of law moves away from the territorial concepts that historically governed to a balancing of the objectives of the plaintiff and
defendant. Silberman, supra note 5, at 85-86.
190. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

1988]

JURISDICTION BY NECESSITY

designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the

overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than medio191
cre ones."
Under this decision, even if a court denied a plaintiff recovery due to a
fundamental difference in the laws of two nations, a properly sympathetic court still should not improperly apply its own law to achieve an
equitable result. Jurisdiction by necessity should only provide a plaintiff
192
with an opportunity to have a day in court, not ensure him a recovery.
Given the great, substantial impact that choice of law has upon the
rights of individuals, courts should maintain a choice of law analysis separate from the jurisdictional analysis. In any event, the considerations
necessary for a proper choice of law must not be subordinate to the jurisdictional analysis.1 " 3
C. Enforcement of Judgments
Enforcement of judgments bears a similar relationship to jurisdiction.
The enforcement of judgments is closely connected to the jurisdictional
analysis, while having its own distinct place in the adjudication process."9 "Enforcement" is the ability of a court to implement its holdings
or to render its judgments effective. Within the boundaries of the United
States, enforcement of sister-state judgments causes little problem because article IV of the Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."' 95 In the international setting, neither the
United States nor foreign countries can give similar assurance. A country
cannot assert jurisdiction over a party and enforce a judgment merely
because it believes that judgment to be accurate and just. Some other
nation may choose to assert jurisdiction over the same cause of action
and then seek to enforce a judgment of different terms within its own
borders. 96 If the forum country is to receive the cooperation of other

191. Id. at 90 n.22 (quoting in part Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
192. Compare supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (promoting the plaintiff's
right to a day in court) with supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (suggesting a
plaintiff has no automatic right to a day in court).
193. Silberman, supra note 5, at 82. As Silberman states, "if a court has the power
to apply its own law, it should have the power to exercise jurisdiction over the action."
Id. at 88 (emphasis omitted).
194. See von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 92, at 1126.
195. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

196. Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 92, at 1126-27.
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sovereigns in gaining enforcement of judgments and remedies, its courts
must consider what other judicial systems are likely to consider appro1 97

priate and reasonable.

The guiding principle for United States courts, and courts of other
countries concerned with the proper enforcement of foreign judgments, is
known as "international comity." Justice Gray stated in Hilton v. Guyot
that:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 198
This ambiguous standard is subject to a multitude of interpretations, and
has been best paraphrased as "recognition will be given when it will be
given."91 United States courts have followed a practice of enforcing foreign judgments when they find that the foreign court accorded the parties
justice and fair treatment.20 0
Practical considerations, such as the likelihood of enforcement, are a
major part of a necessity jurisdiction analysis, but they alone should not
determine whether a court asserts jurisdiction. Jurisdictional rules presuppose that potential forums will not take offense at any particular
court's assertion of jurisdiction in an action, and that other potential forums similarly will not seek to frustrate or deny enforcement of any results of the proceedings. 2 ' Thus, before a United States court asserts
jurisdiction in a lawsuit with international ramifications, that court
should consider whether a foreign country would recognize or enforce
the judgment of the United States court. However, where no foreign forum is available as an alternative for the action, no real reason not to
assert jurisdiction exists, even though enforcement may present problems.
It is entirely possible that the foreign country could be persuaded to recognize any United States court judgment, or that the domestic court may

197. Id. at 1127.
198. 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). See generally Recent Development, 20 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 217, 219 (1985).
199. Recent Development, supra note 198, at 220 (quoting Smit, InternationalRes
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 UCLA L. REV. 44, 54
(1962)).
200. 159 U.S. at 202. The Court requires fairness in proceedings if they are to conform with due process guarantees.
201. Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 92, at 1127.
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be able partially to fulfill the judgment within its own borders.2" 2 It is
not only theoretically preferable, but eminently practical, that all actions
should be governed under the overriding protection of international
comity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The hypothetical situation presented at the outset of Part IV of this
Note offers an ideal situation for the application of jurisdiction by necessity under the guidelines suggested in this Note. The traditional analysis
would produce a ruling that the defendant has insufficient contacts with
the forum for an assertion of jurisdiction. However, the plaintiff is a
citizen, presumably injured, who can only be made whole if his suit is
heard in the United States. First, under the aggregation of contacts approach, even though the defendant may only have one contact with the
forum, he has substantial contacts throughout the United States in business, and reasonably can expect to become involved in lawsuits arising
from his business activities. Furthermore, no alternative providing the
plaintiff with any opportunity to have his claim fairly determined appears to exist-the plaintiff might be able to get a determination, but he
would not have an impartial hearing. The foreign forum (where a res
for payment of any damages verdict for the plaintiff is located) may
choose not to recognize any action taken by the court, but the property
located in the United States may give a partial satisfaction to any judgment. The defendant suffers no harm, since he still receives those constitutional protections. In addition, if the defendant legitimately rebuts the
plaintiff's claim that the United States is the only available forum, then
the defendant should probably receive a declaration of forum non conveniens and get the case dismissed. Admittedly, the United States court
may not be thoroughly comfortable applying foreign law where appropriate. However, this problem pales next to the service of justice which
accepting jurisdiction may accomplish. Assuming no overriding international considerations, United States courts, through jurisdiction by necessity, can fill a void that presently exists in the law.
While jurisdiction by necessity may appear to fill a void in the range
of remedies available to plaintiffs, the area it addresses is not at all devoid of guidance. The theoretical motivation behind support for the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity is fairness, but in practice the doctrine
reverts to the territorial concepts of Pennoyer. By continually expanding
jurisdiction in the interest of justice, the theory amounts to a ruling that

202.

Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 92, at 1126-27.
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any time a foreign defendant has contact with the United States, even if
its effect is in the foreign country, that defendant risks being hauled into
a United States court. While a defendant should be expected to answer
for his actions, the common concept of fairness does not hold that such a
defendant could and should foresee many of those actions. In theory,
constitutional due process protects against any noxious overreaching. In
reality, parochial attitudes in the courts obscure those protections. Using
forum non conveniens as a means of protecting defendants courts can
twist a well-defined legal doctrine into a catch-all bar to actions they feel
are improper. To allow courts to proceed using such an individualistic
analysis-as an adoption of jurisdiction by necessity would dictate-would subordinate general, predictable legal principles to situational decision-making. 03° The potential impact on international transactions and legal harmony reaches far beyond the plaintiff and defendant
of a particular case and even broaches separation of powers considerations. The Congress and the Executive are the appropriate bodies to address international matters. If Congress legislates to provide power to the
courts to assert jurisdiction over certain international situations, this legislation would take into account important political and foreign affairs
concerns and knowledge of international political realities, not simply
one court's sympathy for one plaintiff.
The above argument appears to strike a balance between the interests
of plaintiff and defendant. However, in the end, a plaintiff will receive
his opportunity to obtain justice most of the time. At other times-those
situations with which this Note is concerned-jurisdiction, an element of
procedure, in effect serves as judge and jury over the plaintiff. Those
rules which the court system has developed to regulate the flow of its
business are allowed to interpose themselves into real-life disputes, becoming outcome-determinative. The substance of a lawsuit, the true essence of matters which should come before the court, becomes obscured
by the "envelope of .

.

.

technical forms."20 4 As Justice Brennan

declared:
[Clases [may] approach the outer limits of International Shoe's jurisdictional principle. But that principle .

.

. may be outdated ....

['J]ustice'

can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no
longer justified. ...
•..* Though [InternationalShoe]... represented a major advance, the
structure of our society has changed .... [And] "a trend is clearly discern-

ible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over for203. As the old legal saw has it, "hard facts make bad law."
204. R. MILLAR, supra note 1, at 3.
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eign corporations and other nonresidents." 2

5

Jurisdiction by necessity does not expand or introduce any startling
new concepts; it merely allows a specific type of plaintiff his chance for a
fair day in court. Under a traditional jurisdictional analysis, plaintiffs
who have been injured or wronged but whose causes of action lack certain judicially defined elements are left without a remedy. The philosophy is, it would seem, that "it is expedient.., that one man should die
for the people, and that the whole nation should not perish. ' 20 8 At some
point, however, the courts must decide whether they are more interested
in expedience or justice.
Tracy Lee Troutman

205. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 307-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
in part McGee, 355 U.S. at 222).
206. John 11:50 (New American Standard).

